| SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD DECISION DOCUMENT | |||
| Decision Information | |||
Docket Number:   | NOR_42128_0 | ||
Case Title:   | SOUTH MISSISSIPPI ELECTRIC POWER ASSOCIATION V. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY | ||
Decision Type:   | Decision | ||
Deciding Body:   | Entire Board | ||
| Decision Summary | |||
Decision Notes:   | DECISION GRANTED SOUTH MISSISSIPPI ELECTRIC POWER ASSOCIATION'S MOTION TO ESTABLISH A PROCEDURAL SCHEDULE FOR THIS PROCEEDING. | ||
| Decision Attachments | |||
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| Full Text of Decision | |||
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41464 SERVICE
DATE – LATE RELEASE MARCH 14, 2011 EB SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION BOARD DECISION Docket No. NOR
42128 v. NORFOLK
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY Digest:[1] This decision establishes a procedural schedule for
this proceeding and clarifies that the parties to this large rate case should
have conferred with each other on procedural matters within 7 days after the
shipper filed its complaint with the Board.
Decided: March 14, 2011 This decision grants a motion of South Mississippi
Electric Power Association (SMEPA) to establish a procedural schedule for this
proceeding. BACKGROUND In a complaint filed on December 28, 2010, SMEPA challenges
the reasonableness of rates, rules, and other terms established by Norfolk
Southern Railway Company (NSR) for the transportation of coal from NSR-served
mine origins and origin groups in Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee,
and Alabama, and from NSR-served docks in Mobile, Ala., to SMEPA’s R.D. Morrow,
Sr. Generating Station, near Richburg, Miss.[2] On January 11, 2011, SMEPA filed a motion to
establish a procedural schedule in which it requests that the Board implement
the procedural schedule attached to its motion as Appendix A. On January 31, 2011, NSR filed a reply in
which it contends that it would be premature to establish a procedural schedule
because parties are not required to confer regarding procedural matters until
the 7th day following the end of mediation, which remains ongoing in this
dispute. Alternatively, NSR requests
that the Board adopt the procedural schedule attached to its reply as Exhibit
A. In its motion, SMEPA states that NSR has refused to
negotiate a procedural schedule that would govern this case, as required by
Board rules. SMEPA states that, as a
basis for its refusal to negotiate a procedural schedule, NSR cites
49 C.F.R. § 1111.10(b) of the Board’s regulations, which
provides: Stand-alone
cost or simplified standards complaints. In complaints challenging the reasonableness
of a rail rate based on stand-alone cost or the simplified standards, the
parties shall meet, or discuss by telephone, discovery and procedural matters
within 7 days after the mediation period ends. The parties should inform the Board as soon
as possible thereafter whether there are unresolved disputes that require Board
intervention and, if so, the nature of such disputes. SMEPA
acknowledges that the language of the regulation appears unambiguous, but
argues that other Board regulations contradict it, including
49 C.F.R. § 1109.4(f), which provides: “Absent a specific order from the Board, the
onset of mediation will not affect the procedural schedule in [SAC] rate cases,
set forth at 49 CFR 1111.8(a).”
Section 1111.8(a) establishes a default schedule for use in SAC
rate cases, like this one, and provides that parties must meet to discuss
discovery and procedural matters within 7 days following the filing of the
complaint. SMEPA submits that the Board may have adopted
49 C.F.R. § 1111.10(b) in error, as part of a rulemaking in
which the Board established rules governing rate cases using the Board’s
simplified standards.[3] SMEPA argues that the rulemaking dealt
“exclusively with rate disputes other
than those brought under the SAC constraint.”[4] SMEPA contends that while the Board intended
to permit parties to confer as late as 7 days following the end of mediation in
simplified standards rate cases, it erroneously made this deadline applicable
to SAC cases as well. In its reply, NSR argues that the “unambiguous,
express language” of § 1111.10(b) controls in this matter, and that the
Board should deny SMEPA’s motion as premature.[5]
NSR contends that § 1111.10(b) is
controlling because the Board adopted it more recently than the other
regulations cited by SMEPA, and that waiting until after the conclusion of
mediation to implement a procedural schedule will not harm SMEPA. Alternatively, NSR argues that if the Board
establishes a procedural schedule at this time, it should use NSR’s proposed
schedule rather than SMEPA’s, because SMEPA’s schedule does not allow NSR
sufficient time to analyze SMEPA’s evidence and prepare a reply, and does not
allow NSR sufficient time to prepare its final brief. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS As noted above,
49 C.F.R. § 1111.10(b) provides that in both SAC and simplified
standards rate cases, parties are not required to confer regarding discovery
and procedural matters until 7 days after the conclusion of mediation. However, both 49 C.F.R. §§ 1109.4(f)
and 1111.8(a) indicate that in SAC cases, parties must confer regarding
discovery and procedural matters no later than 7 days after a complaint is
filed. While SMEPA contends that §§ 1109.4(f)
and 1111.8(a) control in this matter, and NSR argues that § 1111.10(b)
controls, both parties note that the rules require clarification.[6] We agree that there is ambiguity in the Board’s
rules regarding when litigants must discuss procedural matters in SAC rate
cases. However, given that the weight of
the Board’s rules holds that the mediation period does not toll the parties’
obligation in SAC rate cases to confer regarding procedural matters, including
negotiating a procedural schedule, and given that it is unclear from the
decision adopting final rules in Simplified
Standards whether
the changes to § 1111.10(b) were intended to apply in SAC rate cases, we find that the
better reading of the rules in this case is to follow §§ 1109.4(f) and 1111.8(a). Moreover, this reading is consistent with Seminole
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. CSX Transportation, Inc., NOR 42110 (STB
served Oct. 21, 2008), which denied a motion to hold in abeyance the
default SAC procedural schedule pending the conclusion of mediation. Citing § 1109.4(f), that decision
reiterated that the Board intended for mediation and the early stages of the
procedural schedule to run concurrently in SAC rate cases. Seminole Elec., slip op. at 1-2. As a result, SMEPA’s motion to establish a
procedural schedule is timely and will be considered. Because SMEPA and NSR have not yet agreed upon a
procedural schedule to govern in this matter, the Board will implement one,
drawing upon the proposed schedules that the parties submitted in their
pleadings. The proposed schedules are identical
through September 2, 2011, which both parties agree should be the
deadline for SMEPA to file its opening evidence. The schedules then diverge. NSR requests until January 20, 2012, to file
its reply evidence, while SMEPA’s
proposed schedule provides until December 2, 2011. In support of its later proposed reply
deadline, NSR notes that SMEPA plans to challenge its rates using the revenue
adequacy constraint, in addition to the SAC constraint. Because the Board has limited precedent on
the revenue adequacy constraint, NSR contends that additional time to address
novel and complex issues will be required.
We agree that the revenue adequacy aspect of SMEPA’s complaint will
likely introduce into this proceeding novel and complex issues. However, there is no reason to believe at
this juncture that those issues will require the full amount of time proposed
by NSR. NSR’s reply, therefore, will be
due on December 16, 2011. SMEPA
and NSR propose nearly identical timeframes for calculating the deadline for
SMEPA to file its rebuttal evidence. As
a result, SMEPA’s rebuttal will be due on March 2, 2012. Following rebuttal evidence, the parties’
proposed deadlines once again diverge.
SMEPA requests 31 days to file closing briefs following rebuttal, while NSR
requests 48 days. Thirty-one days should
provide the parties with sufficient time to prepare closing briefs. See M&G Polymers
USA, LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc., NOR
42123, slip op. at 2 (STB served Feb. 24, 2011) (adopting jointly
proposed 30-day deadline for closing briefs).
Closing briefs will therefore be due on April 2, 2012. This decision will not significantly affect either
the quality of the human environment or the conservation of energy resources. It is ordered: 1. SMEPA’s motion to establish a procedural
schedule is granted. 2. The
procedural schedule for this proceeding is as follows: June 15, 2011 Discovery completed July 15, 2011 Joint submission of operating
characteristics September
2, 2011 Complainant’s
opening evidence due December
16, 2011 Defendant’s
reply evidence due March 2,
2012 Complainant’s rebuttal evidence due April
2, 2012 Closing briefs due 3. This
decision is effective on its service date. By the
Board, Chairman Elliott, Vice Chairman
Nottingham, and Commissioner Mulvey. [1] The digest
constitutes no part of the decision of the Board but has been prepared for the
convenience of the reader. It may not be
cited to or relied upon as precedent. Policy
Statement on Plain Language Digests in Decisions, EP 696 (STB served Sept.
2, 2010). [2] In its
complaint, SMEPA also states that the challenged NSR tariffs, circulars, and
publications may contain unreasonable charges and may constitute unreasonable
practices in violation of 49 U.S.C. §§ 10702 and 10746. On January 18, 2011, NSR filed a motion to
dismiss the unreasonable practice claim, and SMEPA filed a reply on February 7,
2011. The Board will address NSR’s
motion to dismiss in a separate decision. [3] See Simplified
Standards for Rail Rate Cases, EP 646 (Sub-No. 1) (STB served Sept. 5,
2007), aff’d sub nom. CSX Transp., Inc. v. STB, 568 F.3d
236 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and vacated in part on reh’g, CSX
Transp., Inc. v. STB, 584 F.3d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2009). [6] SMEPA’s Mot. 3 (“[T]he Board . . . should . . . clarify
the procedural obligations of parties to SAC cases pending formal correction of
the language in question.”); NSR’s Reply 10 n.7 (“To eliminate confusion, the
Board may wish to . . . clarify[] that the timing of the
conference of the parties suggested by the former schedule has been superseded
by Section 1111.10(b).”). | |||