| SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD DECISION DOCUMENT | |||
| Decision Information | |||
Docket Number:   | NOR_42108_0 | ||
Case Title:   | THE SPRINGFIELD TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY—PETITION FOR DECLARATORY ORDER—REASONABLENESS OF DEMURRAGE CHARGES | ||
Decision Type:   | Decision | ||
Deciding Body:   | Entire Board | ||
| Decision Summary | |||
Decision Notes:   | DECISION: (1) GRANTED THE PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY FORE RIVER WAREHOUSING AND STORAGE CO., INC. (FORE RIVER), (2) GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART FORE RIVER’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY; AND (3) SET A NEW PROCEDURAL SCHEDULE. | ||
| Decision Attachments | |||
| 19 KB | |||
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| Full Text of Decision | |||
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40375 SERVICE
DATE – JUNE 16, 2010 EB SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD DECISION Docket No. NOR 42108 THE SPRINGFIELD TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY—PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY ORDER—REASONABLENESS OF DEMURRAGE CHARGES Decided: June
11, 2010 This decision (1) grants the partial motion to dismiss filed
by Fore River Warehousing and Storage Co., Inc. ( BACKGROUND The
Springfield Terminal Railway Company (ST) filed a petition for declaratory
order seeking to have the Board resolve a dispute over demurrage charges that
ST assessed against Fore River in 2004 (2004 charges) and in 2006 (2006
charges).[1] By decision served on February 10, 2009
(February 10 decision), the Board instituted a declaratory order
proceeding, but only for the 2006 charges, as collection of the 2004 charges
appeared to be time-barred.[2] On October 6, 2009, In a
decision served on October 28, 2009, the procedural schedule in this proceeding
was held in abeyance until the Board could rule on the motion to compel. The Board directed ST to inform the Board of
the status of any collection action it may be pursuing as to the charges at
issue here. It also provided that In
its partial motion to dismiss, PRELIMINARY MATTER On
October 27, 2009, DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSIONS Partial motion to
dismiss Prior
to filing its partial motion to dismiss before the Board, Here,
the parties disagree over when the demurrage charges subject to Fore River’s
partial motion to dismiss accrued under 49 U.S.C. § 11705(a). Fore River argues that the charges accrued
upon constructive placement of railcars, which it argues occurred before ST
re-filed its court action, and ST argues that the charges accrued when they were
invoiced to Fore River or when those invoices were due to be paid, which ST
argues occurred after it re-filed its court action. Although
neither side cites any precedent in support of its position, the matter is
clear. The statute provides that a “claim [under § 11705(a)] related to a
shipment of property accrues under this section on delivery or
tender of delivery by the rail carrier .” (Emphasis added.) 49 U.S.C.
§ 11705(g). The courts have found that a claim under § 11705(a) for
demurrage accrues upon delivery. See Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Carolina Portland Cement Co., 16 F.2d 760, 762 (4th Cir. 1927),
quoting Davis v. Timmonsville Oil Co., 285 F. 470, 472 (4th Cir. 1922)
(“[d]emurrage charges are part and parcel of the transportation charges, and
are covered by the same rules of law.”); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry.
v. Benchcraft, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 603, 604 (W.D. Mo. 1974). The Board has interpreted the date of delivery
(or tender of delivery) as the date the railcars are placed
at the shipper’s facility, either actually or constructively. See Capitol Materials Inc.—Petition for Declaratory
Order—Certain Rates and Practices of Motion to compel The motion to compel will be denied in part and granted
in part. With respect to the requested
documents that ST represents it has provided to ST’s
bare assertion is insufficient to demonstrate that the “change in status”
records cannot be produced. First, ST
fails to support its assertion that the records cannot be produced without
IP/Verso’s consent; ST provides no evidence of any non-disclosure or
confidentiality agreement that would prohibit ST from producing documents in
its possession. Second, ST fails to
explain why such records would be commercially sensitive in any event. Moreover, even if the records contain confidential, proprietary, or commercially sensitive
information, it is well-settled that a protective
order ensures that such information will be used solely for the involved
proceeding and not for other purposes. See Pennsylvania Power &
Light Company v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, et al., Docket No. NOR 41295 (STB served Mar. 10, 1997). Thus, if ST is
concerned that the records contain protectable information, then ST may wish to
consult with IP/Verso to determine the level of confidentiality appropriate for
production of those records and file a motion for the appropriate protective
order before producing those records. ST argues that it is irrelevant whether IP/Verso directs
ST to ship its product in railcars to Accordingly,
ST will be directed to provide This action will not significantly affect either the
quality of the human environment or the conservation of energy resources. It is ordered: 1. Fore River’s motion for leave to file a reply
to ST’s reply in opposition to the motion to compel is denied. 2. Fore River’s partial motion to dismiss is granted. 3. Fore River’s motion to compel is granted in
part and denied in part, as discussed above. 4. ST is directed to file any necessary
protective order and provide the requested documents by July 7, 2010. 5. Fore River’s
reply statement is due by August 5, 2010. 6. ST’s rebuttal
statement is due by August 25, 2010. 7. This decision
is effective on its date of service. By the Board, Chairman Elliott, Vice Chairman Mulvey, and
Commissioner Nottingham. [1] In March 2007, ST originally filed a
collection action for both the 2004 charges and 2006 charges against [2] In the February 10 decision, the Board provided that, if ST obtained an order from the court that the 2004 charges are not time-barred by the 3-year statute of limitations under 49 U.S.C. 11705(a), then the Board would consider ST’s petition concerning the 2004 charges. ST has not submitted any court order addressing the 2004 charges. [3] ST states that
IP/Verso ( [4] We do not reach the issue of whether equitable tolling should be applied to the charges barred under § 11705(a) as the parties do not address that issue before the Board. We defer to the court as to any tolling determination before the court. [5] In its reply
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